## LETTER

To the REVEREND

## Dr. WATERLAND,

Occasion'd by his Late Writings


In DEFENCE of the

Athanasian Hypothesis.

By Philanthropus Oxoniensis.

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SIR.



HILE you are contending with Dr. Clarke, Mr. Whiston, and other learned Adversaries, about the true and genuine Sense of Scripture, and primitive Antiquity; I cannot but observe

with Wonder, that you have, by I know not what fort of Contrivance, really chang'd the State of the Question, which is now no longer about the Sense of Scripture and Antiquity, but about common Sense it felf, and the very first Principles of Reason. I find you are not agreed with your learned Adversaries, in any one Thing; but what is with them a felf-evident Truth, may be with you a Contradiction; and on the other hand, what they declare as an express Contradiction, may be, and often is in your Account, a great and necessary Truth: 'Tis plain therefore, that the Controversy betwixt the Athanasians and the rest of the World, can never he brought to an Is-. fue upon the Foot it now stands. There is no disputing to any Purpose, till we are first agreed upon some common Principles, or at least, till

the Point be determined, whether there be any fuch Thing as common Principles of Sense and Reason among Mankind or not. To what Purpose would a Set of Workmen pretend to agree in the measuring their Work by one and the same Rule, while they can't agree about the Nature and Dimensions of the Rule it self? Some contending that it is one Foot long, others two, others three; and some again, that it is of no determinate Length at all; that it is neither finite nor infinite, streight nor crooked; or at least, of so mystical a Nature, that 'tis impossible to determine of what Length it is, or whether it be a Rule or not. Suppose all the Astronomers in the World should be agreed that the Caroline Tables are the best, and most exact for determining the Calestial Morions, while they dispute about the Arithmetical Principles and numeral Construction of the Tables themselves; some contending they ought to be understood and apply'd, according to the Decimal, others according to the Duodecimal, and others again, according to the Sexageffimal Account and Denomination; nay, they dispute whether the Mark of Unity in the Tables, ought not to stand for three Units; and whether the Figure 3 must not sometimes stand for Three, and fometimes for One; and this too, in a Sense which no body is ever like to find out: Must not other People from hence be tempted to conclude, either that these Tables can be of no use at all, or at least that those Gentlemen find it for their Interest, to keep the Secret to themselves, that Men might not too generally arrive to the Knowledge of Astronomy. For my own Part, I cannot think that the Scriptures are writ upon more unintelligible Principles, than the Caroline Tables, fince

fince I am fure they were defign'd for a more general Use, and in a Matter of infinitely greater Importance. And I make no doubt, but that there are some common Principles, in which Men may, and in reality must agree, whether they acknowledge it or not: However, when I fee a Man denying in Words those common Principles, I cannot presently impeach his Honefty, or conclude that he has any ill Defign upon me; because 'tis possible his Understanding may be so far enflav'd to an Hypothesis, and his Mind darkned with general, confus'd, and ambiguous Sounds, that he may not fee or observe the Inconfistency or Contradiction of his own Words; nay, perhaps he may be really of the fame Mind with his Adverfaries, and fee and know himfelf to be fo; but yet may think himself bound in Conscience to talk unintelligibly, and to keep above the gross impure Regions of common Sense. However, I think it worth while to enquire, whether the Christian Rule of Faith be indeed intelligible; and whether you have not defended the Athanasian Hypothesis upon Principles, which might ferve equally to defend Transubstantiation, or any other Contradiction in the World?

Whoever reads your Writings with Attention, must needs observe in how confused, general, and doubtful a Sense you all along make use of the Words, God, Hypostasis, Unity, and Identity; to each of which Words you have several Meanings, which you take out, or slip in, alter and vary at Pleasure, and just as the Exigence requires, without giving your Reader any fair Notice of it: Nay, if you happen to drop any thing that may seem to glance at what you aim at, and give one any Light into your real Meaning, 'tis so nicely guarded,

and deliver'd with such extreme Caution and Wariness, as if you was afraid of nothing so much, as of being understood: However, fince you have frankly, and thus far fairly declar'd against the Sabellian Sense of Unity and Identity, as apply'd to God, Substance, and Hypostasis or Person; it will be worth while to enquire, whether you can have any other than a Tritheistick Meaning; or whether you have indeed hit upon any Medium of Unity, any Principle of Individuation, that can fave you from Tritheism. You give us Leave to conceive of your Meaning, with respect to Hypostasis or Person, in the common authoriz'd Sense of the Word, as it stands for an Intelligent Agent, or Intelligent, Active Substance: For fince Intelligence and Agency, or Active Power, are only Properties or Attributes, we must necessarily suppose the Substance it self to be the Agent, the Thing acting, or the Subject which is endued with felf conscious Intelligent Agency. But indeed I need not take pains to prove this, because you acknowledge, and often repeat it, that by Hypostasis or Person, you mean not a Mode only, but a real substantial Person. Now in the same Sense that one Person is one Intelligent Agent, or Active Substance; 'tis evident that Three Persons must be Three Intelligent, Active Substances. I doubt not but you will be here ready to clap in your other Sense of one Substance, and cry out, that Three Agents are but One Undivided Substance: I shall suppose for the present, this Composition of Substances to be another Sense of one Substance, that I may allow you, according to your Talent, to abound in different Senses; yet Itill I say, that under the same Sense in which One Person is One Intelligent, Active Substance, 10 in that Sense precisely, Three Persons must be Three Intelligent Active Substances; and the Denial of this must pass for an express Contradiction. even in the Schools, upon the last Pinch; because it would be affirming and denying the same thing at the same time, and in the very same Sense. And indeed when you are forced to own, that the Three Persons are but One Person, and that One Person again Three Persons, in different Senfes and Respects; why can you not as well fav. that in the same different Senses and Respects there are Three Substances, and yet but One Subflance. The same Nature of the thing, the very fame Reason and Necessity must lead you to fay the one, as well as the 'her, if you dar'd speak out; but fince you are obstinate, and will not do it. I challenge you to give any berter Reason for it than this, That it would not so well suit with your Hypothesis, which being inconsistent with it felf, must really overthrow what it only seems to establish. I believe every one must allow, that One Independent, Omniscient, All-powerful Agent is the true and proper Definition of One God; confequently Three fuch Agents, which your Hyyothefis lays you under a Necessity of admitting, must be Three Gods; you will say doubtless, that they ought to be confidered as united in one Undivided Substance, and so the Three Perfons are but One God: But then you fay likewife, that, as thus confider'd, they are but One Person, and therefore still they must be Three Gods, in the same Sense that they are Three Persons.

But to let the Reader see a little farther the Excellency of your Hypothesis; I shall now shew, that it lays you under a Necessity all along, of using the word God in no less than four different

Senses;

Senses; in every one of which there is something included, essential to the Nature and Definition of the thing, that is left out in all the rest; and consequently they cannot be God in the same Sense, or one and the same God. When you apply the word God to the Person of the Father. and fay God the Father, or God who is the Father, 'tis evident you must identify God with the Person of the Father; and consequently in the Nature and Definition of God, as thus understood, you must include the Idea of Unorigination, or absolute, intrinsick, and personal Self-necessity, or Self-existence; which being peculiar and essential to God the Father, cannot be taken into the Nature and Definition of God, when the same Name is apply'd to any other Person. Again, when you fay God the Son, you must here, in the Nature and Definition of God, include the Ideas of Filiation, and communicated Subfiftence from the Father only; which being effential to God the Son, cannot make a Part of the complex idea express'd by the word God, when it is made use of, as the Name or Denomination of any other. In like manner the Property of Procession, or communicated Subfistence, both from the Father and the Son, must alter the Signification of the same Word, when apply'd to the Spirit as God. And laftly, when you apply the fame word, God, to all Three Persons conjunctly, or consider'd as united in your one undivided Substance, you join all the inconfistent Ideas together in One God, who is then likewise said to be One Person; as if all these contrary and incompatible Properties could possibly exist in one and the same simple, individual Subject or Substance. You will say perhaps, that tho' the word God, has these different personal

Senses, from whence the real Distinction of Perfons must arise; yet these Persons, whether confider'd distinctly or conjunctly, are one and the fame God: Which is as much as faying, that tho' you use the word God, in four different Senses. vet these different Senses are but one and the same Sense; but still God in another, and another Sense, will be another, and another God, do what you can. And indeed the Absurdity here is fo gross and apparent, that 'tis impossible for any Colourings of Sophistry to hide it: For who does not, or may not fee, that what in the common Language and Cant of the Schools is call'd the same thing in different Senses, must in Truth and Reality be quite different things? For as these different Senses must necessarily alter the Nature and Definition of the thing, the fame thing in Sound will be in Truth really and effentially different things; which different things trump'd upon the Understanding, under the same Sound, may be as contrary and incompatible, as Light and Darkness, Truth and Falshood. And that they are so in your Hypothesis, is evident from hence; that you have not been able to establish the Notion of One God, in any Sense at all, without fupposing and allowing the Three Persons to be but one and the same Person, in the same Sense that God is One. And here I might fairly leave it to your Choice, whether you will take Sabellianism or Trubeism, fince you are evidently suspended in the Air, and without any Foundation, betwixt em both. However, for Speculation Sake, and because I am also willing to do you all possible Justice, I shall consider your Hypothesis a little farther with respect to your One Undivided Substance, as a Principle of Identity and Individuation;

tion; but before I do this, I must inform the Reader, what I take to be your real Notion, that you may explain your felf more distinctly to the World, if I am mistaken about it; or mend your Hypothesis, if you should find it defective. Since then the Sabellian Notion, of one numerically fimple and individual Substance, must necessarily overthrow the Foundation of Three real Persons, and by Confequence be abfolutely inconfiftent with a real Trinity; there was plainly a Necessity of supposing Three such Simple, Personal, Individual Substances or Essences; which yet you will not call Substances or Essences in the Plural, because being all equally and infinitely extended, they must, as you suppose, by their Ubiquitary Presences, pervade each other; and by a Sort of mutual Penetration of Essences become one numerical Compound, or individual Substance.

And thus the Three Simple, Personal Essences, of which the one Compound Substance consists, by their intimate Union and Inseparability with respect to Space or Expansion, are, as I conceive, in your Account individuated; and after this manner you have a Trinity in Unity. It will be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to guess at your Meaning by intimate Union, Inhabitation, mutual Penetration, Undividedness, and the like, if you do not borrow all your Ideas of this Kind from the Nature and Properties of Space, or Expansion

fion.

Presuming therefore, that you have not Faculties different from other Men, and that you would be thought to use Words with some Meaning or other, I shall here take leave to make two or three Remarks upon this way of talking.

1. 'Tis manifest that you all along confound Intimate Union, Undividedness, or Inseperability. with Numerical Unity, Individuality, or Identity; tho' thefe are as distinct and different, with refpect to the things themselves fignified by 'em, as any Ideas you can possibly have in your mind. Tis evident, that where different things are confidered as united, be the Union never fo close, intimate, or inseparable, the things themselves must still be suppos'd to retain their proper Individualities, or distinct numerical Diversity, with respect to their real, actual Existence, as much as if they were not fo united. And whenever we lose, or let flip the Idea of actually distinct Individuality, or numerical Diversity, we can no longer confider it under the Notion of a Union, or different things united, but must necessarily conceive of it, as an absolute Identity of the same thing with it self. And tho' different things, thus united, may make one Compound under a different Denomination, and express'd by a collective Name, vet they can never make one Compound of the same Denomination, without confounding the most different Ideas, and destroying the Nature and Reason of things. Let us put the Case; for Instance, that of the Soul and Body, as Two Substances, distinguish'd by some essential and incommunicable Attributes, as suppose intelligent Agency and Solidity; and now let these Two Substances be supposed to be united as closely, intimately, and inseparably as you please; let them mutually inhabit, and pervade, and penetrate each other, or what you will; yet still while they retain their really distinct, essential, and incommunicable Properties, you must necessarily

conceive of them as two Substances, as much as if they were locally separated, and at an infinite Distance. Now tho' the Consequence, or Result of fuch an Union, might be one Compound under a general Denomination, or one Man; where the Term, Man, is taken collectively for the two Substances of Soul and Body united; yet 'tis impossible that their mutual Union, of what Kind foever, should make one Substance, without destroying the first Supposition of two Substances; and also denying, what is at the same time granted, that they have effentially diffinct, and incommunicable Properties. If any one after all this would still resolutely maintain, that the Soul and Body, by their Union, cease to be two Subflances, and are really identify'd into one and the same Substance, what would be thought of him, but that he was under some unhappy Necessity of confounding and destroying the Nature and Reafon of Things, by using indifferently, and without Distinction, the words, White and Black, Light and Darkness?

Now to apply this general Principle to your Hypothesis: You have been oblig'd to allow Three real Hypostases, or Three really distinct, and actually exitting, personal Essences: And this you were under a Necessity of doing, to avoid Sabellianism, and to support the really distinct and incommunicable Properties, which are essentially peculiar to each of the Three Persons. But here, startled at what you had granted, and being well aware, that this would be undisguised Tritheism, you endeavour to make all up again, by running into the contrary Extreme, and contradicting all that you had said. For now rather than lose the Unity, your Three Hypostases, or Personal Essences, thall be

but One Hypostasis or Personal Essence: But how comes this about; how is it possible, that three Substances or Estences, should be but one such? Why, by a certain unconceivable Inhabitation, and mutual Pervasion, or Penetration of Essences, which really identifies them into One and the same Substance. But here lies the Mischief; if they are not only closely and intimately united, but really identified, you have really loft the Trinity, and have created your Three Hypostases, to fnew that you could annihilate them again; if they are only united, and not really identified, you have really lost the Unity, or Sameness of Substance: But if they are really identified, and not really identified, which is what you indeed fay; I think it must be evident to common Sense, that your Hypothesis is really a Contradiction. Here, as I expect, you will fly to your different Respects and Senses, the last Refuge of scholastick Fencing, which never fails of bearing off a Contradiction upon the closest Thrust: And by the Force of this Distinction, I must own, that Light may be Darkness, and Darkness Light; not indeed in the same Sense. as every one must allow; but he who cannot admit it in different Senses, will never be able to fathom the Depths of many learned elaborate Defences. However, this Distinction here, after what has been faid, cannot help you; nor can you get off with it, without a Confession more shameful, than any Error of the meer Understanding; namely, that by Unity you mean Multiplicity, by Identity, Diversity, and by One and the Same Thing, three or four quite different Things. But Truth needs none of these Doublings; nor is it really ferv'd, by all the Subtilty and Windings

ings of the Serpent. You would never want a different Sound, where the Sense is different, if you had not one Sense to conceal, while you are uncovering another; and this again must be wrapt up, while that is suffer'd to take a little Air: Whereas should both in one View be expos'd to the open Light, the Mystery would become a Fest; and the Reader must exchange his Wonder, for a Passion of a merrier Strain. But,

2. I must observe to you farther, that if your Principle of Identity, or Sameness of Substance, be admitted; it cannot in the least serve the Cause you have been contending for. It will stand as well in a different, or contrary Hypothesis, as in yours; and an Heretick will find his Accounts in it, as much as a good Christian: Nay, it will help the Eusebians and Arians out of all their Hardships, and enable them to be Orthodox. without changing their Principles. There is no Necessity of supposing the LOGOS to be a finite Substance, whatever the Manner of Derivation from the Father be, whether by an Eternal Generation before all Times and Ages, or by a Temporary Generation; fince one may as eafily and confiltently suppose the Infiniteness as the Finiteness. even of a created Substance: For fince the first felf existent independent Cause, is allowed by all to be Omnipresent, and All-powerful, and can whenever he pleases, with the same Ease and Freedom, act every where alike; 'tis plain that nothing can reltrain cr limit his Power, in the Production of a finite Being, but his Will. Now Supposing the LOGOS to be a distinct Hypostasis from the Father, and supposing him likewise infinite, or every where existing, whether created or

uncreated; the same universal intimate Union, and mutual Penetration of Hypostases, or simple individual Personal Essences, must necessarily follow; which is the Ground and Foundation of your I-

dentity, or Sameness of Substance.

Here will be the same Inhabitation, the same mutual Pervasion, the same Undividedness, with respect to Space or Expansion; and consequently, the same Identity of Substance: So that your Method will serve to Identify, not only God with God, one divine Hypostasis with another, as they are considered in your Hypothesis; but even an uncreated with a created Substance, or God with a Creature. And now, whether all you call Hereticks, will thank you for what you have done, I cannot say; but this I am sure of, that bating the uncharitable Manner of the Thing, you have done them no harm. But,

3. The great and startling Difficulty, which attends your Principle of Identification, is this, That it must necessarily Identify all Substances, whether Finite or Infinite, with the one infinite, felf-existent Substance. Inhabitation, mutual Pervafion, Penetration and Co-existence, Inseparabity and Undividedness of Substance or Essence, is with you the general Principle of Identification. or that which makes one Substance numerically the fame. Now, whatever is sufficient to identify Substance every where, must do the like any where; and because 'tis impossible for any Finite Substance any where to exist, without coexisting, or undividedly existing with the one infinite Substance, by an intimate Union, mutual Pervasion, and Undividedness of Essence; this must upon your Principle, identify all finite Substances with

the one Substance of God: And being thus identified with one and the same Divine Substance. they cannot be different Subfances from each other: 'Tis true, there will still remain the different, incommunicable and distinct individuating Properties, by which we commonly distinguish different Things from one another; but the most different and incompatible Properties are very confiftent, you know, with one and the same Substance. And seeing they are thus consistent, when confider'd as every where, they must be also confiftent any where confidered, or where ever you confider them in particular. So that I cannot fee but your Principle of Identity, if you would be thought to mean any thing, must coincide with that of Spinofa; that there is a Consubstantiality, or Identity of Essence, betwixt God and the Universe; or that God is all Substance, and there is no other Substance, but the one necessary, selfexistent or Divine Substance. This looks like a very unlucky Appendage to your Hypothesis, and a dead Weight upon it, which I should be glad to know, how you will get rid of. Perhaps the best way may be, to own that you have talk'd without Ideas, and defire that what you have faid, may pass for nothing; and this I believe will be really the Case, as to the far greater part of the Learned World, whether you desire it or no.

Whether this Way of talking about Substances, or Substrata, as the Subjects and Supports of distinct individuating Properties, be agreeable to the real Existence and Nature of Things, or not, is not my Business here to enquire; 'tis sufficient to shew, that if it be granted, it will stand good in one Hypothesis as well as another; and must be attended with Consequences, which you cannot

bear.

bear. I am very well perfuaded, however, that the true System of Nature, when rightly underflood, is still more inconsistent with your Hypothesis; but we need go no farther, fince your own Account of Things, if you will stand to it, is fufficient to overthrow all that you have faid. If you lose your One Substance, you are gone, as having no other Principle of Identity for One God; and while you will retain it, I think you cannot possibly, in the same Sense, suppose more Substances than One: And therefore, an Athanasian, an Eusebian, an Arian, a Socinian, and even an Atheist, will equally find their different and contrary Accounts, in one and the same Thing. And is not Christianity, think you, extreamly clear'd and mended, by this fort of Philosophy, at first brought in by the Fathers, from the Pagan Schools, and now espoused a-new, and farther improved in Defense of the Holy Scriptures, by a Learned modern Divine? Can you indeed fit down, and with Satisfaction bless your self upon the Review, while you have been filling the Heads of Christian People with empty Sounds, and their Hearts with Antichristian Rage, against all those, who will not explain St. Paul and the Scriptures, by Plato, Aristotle, and the Heather Metaphyficks? Really, Sir, if Christianity cannot be understood or defended, but upon such Principles as these, I fear you will never be able to understand or defend it at all. But could you clear your Hypothesis, relating to the Trinity and Unity, from Absurdity and Contradiction, as I believe you cannot; yet there is another Difficulty still behind, more stiff and inflexible than the former; and that is, how to apply your Principles

with any Truth or Confistency to the Christian Doctrine of the Incarnation, and the acknowledged One Person of our Saviour Jesus Christ, after the Word was made Flesh. Could you therefore avoid Tritheism, without falling upon Sabellianism, which is what you have not been able to do; yet still, I can't but think, that it will be alrogether impossible, in your Way, to avoid Nestorianism, without falling upon something worfe. I hope it will not be look'd upon as a Mark of Irreligion or Profaneness, to suppose that Christianity is an intelligible Thing; or to enquire about the meaning of certain Words. which are now made use of, in Matters of the greatest Importance; tho' they are not to be found, thus applied, in the Scripture it felf. I have the greatest Deference for the DoStrines of the Church; but then I must suppose that the Church defigns to be understood; for otherwise her Articles of Faith will not be really Doctrines, but Words only. And as for our own Church of England, I can be very confident, that she never once intended to bind any of her Members to Impossibilities, or expected to have her Articles understood, in any other than a Scripture Sense; and confequently, not to pin down Men to the Athanasian Sense, farther than it may be made intelligible, and confistent with the true Sense of Scripture. Upon this fair and reasonable Suppofition therefore, which cannot be denied me, I must apply my self to you, Sir, for a little farther Satisfaction, in what Sense we are to understand the Athanasian Doctrine, concerning the Incarnation and one Person of Jesus Christ. And here I believe all the World must own, that I could

could not have made a more proper personal Application, since you are universally acknowledged as one of the Ablest and most Learned of our modern Athanasians; and your Obligation to give us all reasonable Satisfaction, is the more peculiar, as you have in a very particular and distinguishing Manner, espoused and interested

your felf in the Athanasian Cause.

The common Dostrine, or at least verbal Daclaration of the Athanasians is this, That Christ, or the LOGOS, by his Incarnation, assumed the whole human Nature, i. e. a true Body, and a Rational Soul, into a Perfonal Union with his Eternal and Divine Person; and fo ever remains Two distinct Natures in One Person. Now here the great and feemingly unfurmountable Difficulty lies in this; How it is possible, in any intelligible Sense, that the Personal LOGOS, an infinite, eternal, and necessarily existing Agent, should be the self-same Person with a finite created human Soul; i. e. How Two such infinitely distant and different Beings, Agents, and Substances, can be one Person, the self-same I, the fame He, or the fame common individual Subject of the most essentially and infinitely different Properties and Actions. Here then it is certain, that the Words, One Person, One Agent, One numerical Self, &c. cannot posfibly be taken in any hitherto known or explain'd Sense; fince to say that a finite, created, human Soul, is the same intelligent Agent, the self-same individual Person, the same Substance, the same personal I, or He, with God Infinite, Eternal, Uncreated, and necessarily Existent; I say, to affirm this in any hitherto known or explain'd Sense, C 2

must be not only the grossest Absurdity and Contradiction, but downright Blasphemy also. When therefore you, with other Athanasians, in a Sense peculiar to your felves, affert this; it cannot appear, till you have explain'd your Meaning, whether you contradict any body or no. Perhaps, if you were able and willing to explain your felves, we might be found all of one Mind, and the Difference might lye in Words only. thing can be more unreasonable therefore, in you and your Party, than thus openly to condemn other People, as dangerous Hereticks, while you will not tell them in what Sense, they can, or ought to be Orthodox. 'Tis certain, that in your Hypothesis, when you say, Christ is God, you mist mean One Person; and when you say, Christ is Man, you must mean another Person, according to the known establish'd meaning of the Word Person, in the common Sense of Mankind: Now if in common Sense you have Two Personal Saviours, Two Christs, and Two Sons of God; One Infinite, Eternal, and Uncreated; and the other. Finite and Created in Time: I fay, if this be so in common Sense; and consequently if the Scripture cannot be understood in, but is a Contradiction to common Sense; you ought in all Reason and Conscience, to tell us in what Sense ir can and must be understood; or fairly own, that it is absolutely unintelligible, and cannot be understood in any Sense at all. However, I am very much inclined to think, that it is not the Scripture Account of Things, but your Account; not the Christian Revelation, but your Hypothesis, that is inconfistent with, and contradictory to common Sense. For the' the Heads and Leaders of Parties ,

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ties may, yet I cannot think that the Holy Ghoff, in the Christian Revelation, would use Words under a different Sense from what they had been ever used among Mankind before, without giving us the least Notice of it. I shall content my self therefore to show, that your Hypothesis is a Contradiction to common Sense, and must make the whole Christian Revelation so too; and then leave you either to affix some other Sense to Scripture, or quit your Principles, as you shall find Occafion. It is granted by all Athanasians, that Christ had a compleat and perfect Human Nature; and that after the Incarnation, he wanted nothing that is effential to Man. But Human Intelligent Agency is effential to Man, as fuch; and 'tis plainly impossible to have any Notion or Idea of Humanity, or Human Nature, without including the Ideas of Human Intelligency, and Human Agency; and Human Intelligent Agency is the fame thing, in the common Sense of Mankind, with Human Personality: From hence then, I think, it is plain, that 'tis impossible to have any Idea at all of Human Nature, without including Human Intelligent Agency, or Human Personality; and confequently it will be alike impossible to conceive of a Man actually Existing, Understanding, and Acting, without conceiving him to be a Human Person. To abstract Human Nature then from Human Personality, and to talk of a true and proper Man, really existing, and acting as Man, who is not a Human Person, is to renounce and deny all the Principles of Reason and common Sense, and to make Words fignify nothing at all. And all this to avoid faying, that the Name Christ, is taken collectively, as being put

for Two Persons, a Divine Person, and a Human Person; tho''tis impossible, in the Athanasian Hypothefis, that the thing should be otherwise. And I here challenge you, upon your own Principles, to make it appear as possible, how Christ should not be a Human Person, and yet be a true and real Man; or to divest him of a Human Per-Sonality, without robbing him of his Human Nature too. You allow him to be a Divine Person; and I think I have proved, that, in your Hypothefis, he must be a Human Person too; and consequently, that the Son of God, and the Son of Man, must, upon your Principles, be Two different Persons, under the common Name of Fesus Christ, and acting in one common Capacity of Mediation: And to suppose otherwise, must oblige you to make one imaginary compound Person of Two simple and real Persons, of Two infinitely different Intelligent Agents; of which compound Person, every thing that can be affirmed or denied, will at the fame time be equally true and false. In your Hypothesis, it is as false that Christ suffered and died for our Sins, as it is true that Christ is God: That Christ is Finite and Infinite, Created and Uncreated, and that he is God and Man, are both true, and both false. That his Father is greater than he, and that he did not, while he was upon Earth, know the Day of Judgment, are both true, and yet both as false as they are true. This, Sir, is your Divinity: But alas for the Dulness of Hereticks! All this comes about for want of distinguishing between the different Senses, in which the same thing may be true and false at the same time. And alas again for the Wisdom of Catholicks! These different

rent Senses will, in spite of your Heart, change the Subject of the Proposition, and make your Same thing, quite different things; and your One Person, Two different Persons, infinitely more different than Michael the Archangel, and St. Paul. But I shall now suppose that you had made all this clear and intelligible, how Two Intelligent Natures may possibly be united in One Person. without either confounding the Natures, or dividing the Person; yet even upon this Supposition. I fay, you cannot, upon your own Principles, have any Notion or Idea of the Humiliation of Christ. or of any possible Satisfaction or Atonement he could make for Sin, but what a Socinian may allow. For call it a Personal Union, or what you will, you cannot but grant, that whatever is created must be essentially different from God; and the Human Nature, or the Man Christ being a Creature, no Talk of Union, or Personal Identity can help you, or in the least alter the Case, while the Distance and Difference are confessedly as equally and infinitely great, as if there was no fuch Union at all. For nothing can be conceived. under a greater and more effential Difference. than the Son of God, and the Son of Man, as they must stand in your Scheme. Now to comply with the Necessity of your Hypothesis, I shall endeavour, for a little while, to talk without Ideas, and suppose the Infinite, Eternal, Uncreated LOGOS, to be the same Person with a Created Human Soul and Body; or, to speak still more unintelligibly, with the Human Nature, i.e. with Man in general, but no Man in particular. Well, but let this be suppos'd to contain some Truth in it, in some Sense or other; and what then

then will be the Consequence? Why, that the Sufferings of the Human Soul, or Human Nature, will acquire an infinite Worth and Value, from the personal Union of the LOGOS. For by reason of the personal Union, what is done or suffered in one Nature only, may be attributed to the whole Person. By Person here, must be meant both Natures, which by their Union constitute the Person; and therefore to say, that what is done or suffered in one Nature only, is attributed to the whole Person, is the same thing with saying, that what is done or suffered in one Nature only, is by a false Attribution supposed to be done or suffered in both Natures. For what is the whole Person, but both Natures united? And indeed, the Real, Vital Union of both Natures, and the mutual Communication of Joys and Sufferings, which is the only Principle that can raise the Dignity and Value of the Human Sacrifice, is here plainly supposed and afferted, at the same time that it must necessarily be deny'd, as inconfistent with the Hypothesis. But since the LOGOS is here supposed to be uncapable of suffering by any Loss or Pain sustained by the Human Nature, what is fuffered in the Human Nature only, cannot be attributed to both Natures, or to the Perfon, without a manifest Absurdity, and Self-contradiction. The whole Person cannot be said to lose or suffer, unless the Loss and Suffering be in both Natures; for the human Nature only, is not the Person. While there is a real, vital Union, for Instance, between the Soul and Body, and a confequent mutual Communication, fo that they must necessarily enjoy, or suffer together; the Sufferings of either, will be the Sufferings

of the whole Man: In which Case, the Sufferings, if they are freely undertaken, will be estimated and valued, in Proportion to the Innocence and Dignity of the Soul, the noblest Part of the Man: But if we suppose the Soul and Body to be fo united, or rather difunited, as to destroy this vital Union and mutual Communication of Joys and Sufferings; the bare Sufferings of the Body, should we suppose it capable of suffering without a real vital Communication with the Soul, could not at all be raised by the Dignity of the Soul; 'tis plainly the Dignity of the Sufferer that must raise the Value of the Sufferings; and therefore where the Sufferer is only a Human Soul, or Human Nature, the bare Name or Sound of Union with the LOGOS, can add no real

Weight or Worth to the Sufferings.

This Hypothesis then, that is so much cried up, and, as it were, adored, on account of an infinite Satisfaction and Atonement, in Truth and Reality affords no Satisfaction at all, beyond the Capacity and Value of Human Nature, or a Human Soul and Body. It will be still urged, perhaps, that where two Natures make one Compound, the Properties and Affections of each may certainly be affirmed of the whole; and that this is justified by the general Consent of Mankind, and the common Use of Language, while the mere Properties and Affections of the Body, as Weight, Statute, Complexion, &c. are affirmed of the Man; but this is only by a usual Figure of Speech, where a Part is put for the whole, or the contrary; and in all fuch Instances; the Man can only fignify the Man's Body; for should we take Man here properly for Soul and Body

Body too, of which the Man really confifts, such

Predications could not possibly be true.

Tis wonderful, how far this gross and palpable Fallacy has prevail'd, and how apt Men are to catch at a figurative, improper Expression, in a loose and popular way of speaking, as if it was strictly true in Argument, and agreeable to the Nature of things. Nothing is more frequent in a common way of speaking, than this Sort of Metonymy, where the Name of the Whole is put for a Part only, or the Name of a Part for the Whole. But in Argument and Strictness of Speech, we ought to take care not to lose the proper Subject of the Predication, by affirming that of the Whole, which is true on-Tis evident, that where any ly of a Part. Whole under a common Name, is made up of two different and distinct Subjects, with their peculiar and different Properties; the Properties of each cannot be affirm'd of the Whole, i. e. of both Subjects. In all fuch Predications, if true, there must necessarily be confidered a real Communication, or Community of the fame Kind of Properties in both Subjects; which being here contrary to the Supposition, such an Affirmation is plainly a Selfcontradiction. In your Hypothesis, there must be an infinite and essential Difference betwixt the LOGOS, and the Human Soulof our Saviour; so that there cannot possibly be suppos'd any real Communication, or Community of Properties; they will have nothing in common, but every thing, both Substance and Properties, effentially and infinitely diffe-And therefore, if you suppose the Name Fesus

Jefus Chrift, affix'd to the whole Person or Compound, confilting of the LOGOS in Union with a Human Soul and Body, there is not one Proposition in Scripture concerning Christ, but what must be necessarily false. In this Hypothesis, it will not be true, that Christ suffered and slied for our Sins; because this is true only of the Human Nature: but the Human Nature only is not Christ. Again; it will not be true, that Christ is God, that he is the Only-begotten of the Father, that he was fent from the Father, and that he took Flesh, to be made an Offering for Sin: This, I fay, in your Hypothesis, cannot be one Word of it true; because all this is true only of the LOGOS, or Divine Nature; but the LOGOS, or Divine Nature only, is not Christ. 'Tis evident, that this Way of talking, supposes Christ or the Person to be some Tertium Quid, some common Subject, in which both Natures Subfift as Properties or Attributes. But what is that Tertium Quid, or common Subject? but the Sum or aggregate of both Natures united. And therefore to affirm the Properties of each Nature of the Person, is the fame Thing with affirming the Properties of each Nature of both Natures; or faying that every Thing that is true of One, is true of Both; which yet is contrary to the Hypothesis. And from hence again, appears the Necessity you are under of filently changing the Subject of the Proposition, as often as you join the Properties of each Nature distinctly, under One Personal Name. Thus when you fay, Christ is God, and Christ is Man; because you retain the same Personal Sound D 2

in both Propositions, the Reader has his Eyes dazzled, and thinks you mean still the same Person, by the same Personal Name, Christ: Whereas in your Hypothesis, you must unavoidably mean Two effentially Distinct, and infinitely different Persons. But here I must defire you to observe, that whenever I say, this or that must necessarily be so, or that fuch or fuch a Thing is false, impossible, or contradictory; I mean only with Respect to common Sense. And therefore all that I pretend to prove is, That your Sense, whatever it be, cannot possibly be common Sense. But I would not be thought hereby to suppose, or intimate, that you have no Sense at all; or that what you fay, is not in your own Sense true. Doubtless you have some Meaning or other; some secret reserv'd Sense, which, when you shall please to speak out, perhaps it may appear, that you and I are of one and the fame Mind; and that we are contending all this while, about Words only. However, if this be so, the Fault is none of mine. I speak freely, and endeavour to speak plainly; and till you will do the like, if there should happen to be any Mifunderstanding betwixt us, the Blame must lie at your Door. Upon the whole, I cannot but think, that without some other fort of Defense, and some clearer Account of Things, than have hitherto appeared on the Athanasian Side; the World must soon begin to suspect that you are but in Fest, and that you write only to betray the Cause you would feem to espouse: This doubtless you will receive

as a very hard Saying, and be ready y, Who can bear it? And I hope, Sir, will not bear it, without answering the Design of it; by telling us plainly, whe-Christianity be an Intelligible Thing, and her it is indeed consistent with Common e, or not.

I am,

SIR,

Your Humble Servant, &c.

FINIS.

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